GOVERNOR'S VETO

GOVERNOR'S VETO

I have signed House Bill 5002, the appropriation bill for the 2006-08 biennium, including four item vetoes.

I have exercised the authority given to the Governor under the Constitution of Virginia to veto specific provisions in the reenrolled appropriation bill.   My four vetoes are technical, but they are substantive in that they maintain the practice of at least the past 20 years with respect to the Governor’s ability to take budget actions while the General Assembly is not in session.  In addition, my vetoes preserve the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.  The rationale for each veto is set out below.

                                                        § 4-1.02

House Bill 5002 adds a number of limitations to the Governor’s authority to reduce appropriations administratively, in the event of an unanticipated revenue shortfall.  Several are unnecessarily restrictive.  Central among these is the requirement that any proposals for budget reductions required due to a revenue shortfall be released to the General Assembly within five calendar days, whether the proposals are approved or not.   Language specifies that this requirement applies equally whether reduction plans are submitted to the Governor, a Cabinet secretary, or a member of the Governor’s staff -  either electronically or in writing.

Requiring the release of a list of reduction options prepared for the Governor’s consideration would have the practical effect of eliminating or severely constraining candid, confidential communication between a governor and his appointees - at a time when such confidential communication is needed most.  Such a change also raises constitutional issues regarding separation of powers and executive privilege.

I fully recognize the legislature’s legitimate right to full disclosure of information related to approved plans for agency reductions.  Indeed, the last time it was necessary to reduce agency appropriations through executive action, the Executive Department was forthcoming in providing the full text of all approved budget reduction plans.

My amendment would have resolved this issue but it was not adopted.  Accordingly, I am vetoing § 4-1.02.  Reporting requirements that were in § 4-1.02 of the Appropriations Act prior to 2004 and that have served past governors and legislatures well will continue to be followed.

                                                        § 4-1. 06 b.

House Bill 5002 included language allowing the State Comptroller to authorize the disbursement of up to $3.0 million against appropriations of a subsequent fiscal year, when an emergency arises or when July 1 falls on a weekend, provided that the Auditor of Public Accounts provides written concurrence.  In practice, this action is very rarely necessary.  Nevertheless, the language is not consistent with past practice, and it also raises an important constitutional issue regarding separation of powers.

By requiring the Auditor of Public Accounts to concur in the action of the State Comptroller, the language in question allows a legislative official to unilaterally prevent an executive official from taking action which he is otherwise charged by law to do.  To cure that constitutional defect, the amendment I submitted would have required the State Comptroller to notify the Auditor of Public Accounts when any instance arose that required such payments.  That amendment was not adopted.  I, therefore, have vetoed § 4-1.06 b.

                                                        § 4-6.01 b..

House Bill 5002 includes new language that attempts to prohibit a Governor from withdrawing a Cabinet nomination during a General Assembly session and then reappointing the same person after adjournment of that legislative session.  This provision is vague in that reappointment is not defined.  The term could mean the reappointment of the same person to the same Cabinet position, reappointment of the same person to a different Cabinet position, or reappointment of the same person to a position that does not require confirmation.  As to the first two possible interpretations, the new provision is unnecessary because it addresses a situation that has never occurred.  The third possible interpretation would be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers.

The present Constitutional provisions governing the appointment and confirmation process for Cabinet level positions are explicit.  Ultimately, any nominee is subject to confirmation by the General Assembly if that person is to serve in the Cabinet.  As such, this new provision is unnecessary.

My amendment to revise this language was not adopted.  I have vetoed § 4-6.01 b., which constitutes a matter of general law, not a condition or restriction on an appropriation item, and to the extent it could be interpreted to prohibit a reappointment to a position not requiring confirmation, would constitute a violation of the separation of powers.  The positions listed in this item will continue to be paid consistent with the amounts specified in House Bill 5002 as re-enrolled.

                                                        § 4-8. 02 b.

House Bill 5002 included in § 4-8.02 b. language requiring that agencies submit to the General Assembly copies of any budget reduction proposals provided to the Governor, the Governor’s Cabinet Secretaries, Chief-of-Staff, or the Department of Planning and Budget.  This language unduly hampers confidential communication between a governor and his appointees, and raises serious constitutional issues involving separation of powers.  My amendment would have resolved this issue but it was not adopted.  I, therefore, have vetoed § 4-8.02 b.  Executive agencies and the Department of Planning and Budget will continue to provide to the General Assembly materials that have traditionally been provided.