## DepartmentofPlanningandBudget 2003FiscalImpactStatement

1.	BillNumber HouseofOrigi SecondHouse	
2.	Patron	McQuigg
3.Committee PassedbothHouses		
4.	Title	VirginiaPublicProcurementAct;reverseauctioning.
5.	• Summary/Purpose: This proposal removes the sunset provisions from legislation that permits state agencies and other public bodies to procure goods and non professional services by reverse auction. A reverse auction is an electronic procure ment to ol permitting vendors' prices for particular goods and non professional services to be revealed to their competitors. As these prices are revealed, all competitors are permitted to resubmit their proposals as many times as they wish until a predetermined time frame for the submission of bids has expired or a next ended period of no activity has passed. Once this time frame has expired or the extended period of no activity has passed, the state agency or public body a wards a contract for the segoods or nonprofessional services to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. The enrolled legislation exempts bulk purchases of commodities used in road and high way construction and maintenance, including a gregates, from purchase by reverse auction.	
6.	FiscalImpactisindeterminate.	
7.	Budgetamendmentn ecessary:No.	
8.	<b>Fiscalimplications:</b> Althoughtheultimatefiscalimpactofthismeasureisindeterminate, permittingthecontinueduseofreverseauctionsshouldresultinlowerpricesforthegoods andnonpersonalservicespurchasedbystateagenci es.Forexample,theDepartmentof GeneralServices(DGS)hassofarconductedthreereverseauctions. Thesereverseauctions, whencomparedtothecostsofthepreviouscontracts, whichwereawardedonthebasisof traditionalprocurementstrategies,pr oducedsavingsoffourto21percent. Thefollowing casesdemonstratethevalueofreverseauctions:	
	(1) DGS used are verse auction to procure bags for the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC). Using this strategy, the number of vendors particular cipating in the procurement action increased from one toten, and when compared to the previous cost of this contract, the lowest bid (\$52,942) yieldeds a vings of \$13,874, or 21 percent.	
	(2)DGSusedareverseauctiontoprocuretherolledaluminumnece ssaryforVirginia CorrectionalEnterprises'productionoflicenseplates.Usingthestrategy,thenumberof vendorsparticipatingintheprocurementactionincreasedfromthreetofourfirms,andwhen	

compared to the previous cost of this contract (\$1.04 aperpound), the lowest bid (\$1.015 per pound) yielded savings of \$38,190, or four percent.

(3)DGSusedareverseauctiontopurchasemattressinsertsforVirginiaCorrectional Enterprises.Inthiscase,thenumberofvendorscompetingforthecontra ctdecreasedfrom threetotwofirms;however,whereastheexistingcontractholderhadoriginallyrequesteda 16percentincreaseinthecostofthecontract,theuseofareverseauctionkeptthatincrease to 13percent, yieldings a vings of \$30,960.

Generally, when used properly, reverse auctions increase both the number of vendors participating in a procurement action and the saving sachieved from that procurement action. In the three examples shown, this maximholds true in two out of three cases. Even in the third case, however, it is clear that despite fewer total participating vendors, there verse auction still produced contracts a ving she cause competitors were able to viewe a chother's prices for the good in question.

- **9. Specificagencyorp oliticalsubdivisionsaffected:** AllpublicbodiesoftheCommonwealth wouldbeaffectedbythisproposal.
- 10. Technicalamendmentnecessary: No.
- **11. Othercomments:** Anumberofentitiesusereverseauctions. Theseentitiesinclude: the Stateso fMaryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; the cities of Chesapeake, Virginia, San Antonio, Texas, and Orlando, Florida; the Fairfax County and city of San Antonio Water Authorities; the U.S. Navy; and numerous privates ector firms.

**Date:** 02/ 24/03/PXV

**Document:** G:\2003legislation\Hb2192er.Doc

cc:SecretaryofAdministration