DepartmentofPlanningandBudget 2003FiscalImpactStatement

	20031 iscailinpactotatement	
1.	BillNumber	HB2192
	HouseofOrigin	n Introduced Substitute Engrossed
	SecondHouse	☐ InCo mmittee ☐ Substitute ☐ Enrolled
2.	Patron	McQuigg
3.0	Committee	GeneralLaws
1 .	Title	VirginiaPublicProcurementAct;reverseauctioning.
5.	• Summary/Purpose: This proposal removes the sunse to provisions from legislation that permitted state agencies and other public bodies to procure goods and nonprofessional services by reverse auction. Are verse auction is an electronic procurement to old permitting vendors' prices for particular goods and nonprofessional services to be revealed to their competitors. As these prices are revealed, all competitors are permitted to resubmit their proposals as many times as they wish until a predetermined time frame for the submission of bids has expired or an extended period of no activity has passed. Once this time frame has	

6. FiscalImpactisindeterminate.

auction.

- 7. Budgetamendmentnecessary: No.
- 8. Fiscalimplications: Althoughtheultimatefiscalimpactofthismeasureisindeterminate, permittingthecontinueduseofreverseauctionsshouldresultinlowerpricesforthegoods andnonpersonalservicespurchasedbystateagencies. For examp le, the Department of General Services (DGS) has so far conducted three reverseauctions. These reverseauctions, when compared to the costs of the previous contracts, which were awarded on the basis of traditional procurements trategies, produced savings of four to 21 percent. The following cases demonstrate the value of reverseauctions:

expiredortheextendedperiodofnoactivityhaspassed,thestateagencyorpublicbody awardsacontractforthesegoodsornonprofessionalservicestothelowestresponsiveand responsiblebidder. The substitute exempts bulk purchases of commodities used in road and highway construction and maintenance, including aggregates, from purchase by reverse

- (1)DGSusedareverseauctiontoprocurebagsfortheDepartmentofAlcoholicBeverage Control(ABC).Usingthisstrategy,thenumberofvendorsparticipatinginth eprocurement actionincreasedfromonetoten,andwhencomparedtothepreviouscostofthiscontract,the lowestbid(\$52,942)yieldedsavingsof\$13,874,or21percent.
- (2)DGSusedareverseauctiontoprocuretherolledaluminumnecessaryforVirg inia CorrectionalEnterprises'productionoflicenseplates.Usingthestrategy,thenumber of vendorsparticipatingintheprocurementactionincreasedfromthreetofourfirms,andwhen

compared to the previous cost of this contract (\$1.043 per pound), the lowest bid (\$1.015 per pound) yielded savings of \$38,190, or four percent.

(3)DGSusedareverseauctiontopurchasemattressinsertsforVirginiaCorrectional Enterprises.Inthiscase,thenumberofvendorscompetingforthecontractdecreasedf rom threetotwofirms;however,whereastheexistingcontractholderhadoriginallyrequesteda 16percentincreaseinthecostofthecontract,theuseofareverseauctionkeptthatincrease to 13percent, yieldings avings of \$30,960.

Generally, when used properly, reverse auctions increase both the number of vendors participating in a procurement action and the saving sachieved from that procurement action. In the three examples shown, this maximholds true in two out of three cases. Even in the third case, however, it is clear that despite fewer total participating vendors, there verse auction still produced contracts a ving sbecause competitors were able to viewe a chother's prices for the good in question.

- **9. Specificagencyorpoliticalsubdi visionsaffected:** AllpublicbodiesoftheCommonwealth wouldbeaffectedbythisproposal.
- 10. Technicalamendmentnecessary: No.
- **11. Othercomments:** Anumberofentitiesusereverseauctions. Theseentitiesinclude: the StatesofMaryland, Mi nnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; the cities of Chesapeake, Virginia, San Antonio, Texas, and Orlando, Florida; the Fairfax County and city of San Antonio Water Authorities; the U.S. Navy; and numerous privates ector firms.

Date: 02/13/03/PXV

Doument: G:\2003legislation\Hb2192h1.Doc

cc:SecretaryofAdministration