## DepartmentofPlanningandBudget 2003FiscalImpactStatement

1.	1. BillNumber HB2192	
	HouseofOrigi	n Introduced Substitute Engrossed
	SecondHouse	☐ InCo mmittee ☐ Substitute ☐ Enrolled
2.	Patron	McQuigg
3.Committee GeneralLaws		GeneralLaws
4.	Title	VirginiaPublicProcurementAct;reverseauctioning.
5.	Summary/Purpose: Thisproposal removes the sunse tprovisions from legislation that permitted state agencies and other public bodies to procure goods and non professional services by reverse auction. A reverse auction is an electronic procurement to olpermitting vendors' prices for particular goods and non professional services to be revealed to their competitors. As these prices are revealed, all competitors are permitted to resubmit their proposals as many times as they wish until a predetermined time frame for the submission of bids has expired or an extended period of no activity has passed. Once this time frame has expired or the extended period of no activity has passed, the state agency or public body awards a contract for the segood sor non professional services to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. When used properly, this to olcanin crease both the number of vendors participating in a procurement action and the saving sachieved from that procurement action.	
6.	FiscalImpactisindeterminate.	
7.	Budgetamendmentnecessary: No.	
8.	Fiscalimplications: Althoughtheultimatefiscalimpactofthismeasureisindeterminate, permittingthecontinueduseofreverseauctionsshouldresultinlowerpricesforthegoods andnonpersonalservicespurchasedbystateagencies. For example, the Department of General Services (DGS) has so far conducted three reverseauctions. These reverseauctions, when compared to the costs of the previous contracts, which were awarded on the basis of traditional procurements trategies, produced savings of four to 21 percent. The following cases demonstrate the value of reverse auctions:	
	(1)DGSusedareverseauctiontoprocurebagsfortheDepartmentofAlcoholicBeverage Control(ABC).Usingthisstrategy,thenumberofvendorsparticipatinginthe procurement actionincreasedfromonetoten,andwhencomparedtothepreviouscostofthiscontract,the lowestbid(\$52,942)yieldedsavingsof\$13,874,or21percent.	
	(2)DGSusedareverseauctiontoprocuretherolledaluminumnecessaryforVirgin ia CorrectionalEnterprises'productionoflicenseplates.Usingthestrategy,thenumberof vendorsparticipatingintheprocurementactionincreasedfromthreetofourfirms,andwhen comparedtothepreviouscostofthiscontract(\$1.043perpound),th elowestbid(\$1.015per	

pound)yieldedsavingsof\$38,190,orfourpercent.

(3)DGSusedareverseauctiontopurchasemattressinsertsforVirginiaCorrectional Enterprises.Inthiscase,thenumberofvendorscompetingforthecontractdecreasedfro threetotwofirms;however,whereastheexistingcontractholderhadoriginallyrequesteda 16percentincreaseinthecostofthecontract,theuseofareverseauctionkeptthatincrease to13percent,yieldingsavingsof\$30,960.

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Consequently,in thesethreeexamples,itbecomesclearthatevenwhenthetotalnumber of vendorsparticipatinginaprocurementmaybelessthanthenumberthanhadparticipated using attraditional procurements trategy, thereverse auction produces contracts avings because the competitors are able to vieweach other's prices for the good in question.

- **9. Specificagencyorpoliticalsubdivisionsaffected:** All public bodies of the Commonwealth would be affected by this proposal.
- 10. Technicalamendmentnecessary: No.
- 11. Othercomments: Anumberofentitiesusereverseauctions. Theseentitiesinclude: the StatesofMaryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; the cities of Chesapeake, Virginia, San Antonio, Texas, and Orlando, Florida; the Fairfax County and city of San Antonio Water Authorities; the U.S. Navy; and numerous privates ector firms.

**Date:** 01/15/03/PXV

**Document:** G:\2003legislation\Hb2192.Doc

cc:SecretaryofAdministration